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Banks and other credit institutions are key players in the transmission of monetary policy, 
especially in emerging market economies, where the responses of deposit and loan interest 
rates to shifts in policy rates are among the most important channels. This pass-through 
depends on the conditions prevailing in the loan and deposit markets, which are, in turn, 
affected by macroeconomic factors. Hence, when setting their policy, monetary authorities 
must take into account those conditions and the behavior of banks. This paper illustrates 
this point by means of a theoretical micro-banking model and shows empirical evidence for 
Colombia suggesting that some aspects of the model might be relevant features of the 
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1. Introduction 
 
In some economies banks and other financial institutions play a key role in the expenditure 
decisions of firms and households. They are among the most important alternatives of 
funding and means of saving.  As such, banks and bank behavior are critical components of 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In particular, the interest rate channel of 
monetary policy, which operates when banks transmit the changes in the monetary policy 
rate to their customers’ interest rates, depends on the banks’ reaction to different shocks 
and to the state of the economy. Hence, when setting their policy, monetary authorities 
should take into account banks’ behavior under different economic conditions.    
 
This paper illustrates the idea that the response of market interest rates to changes in the 
policy interest rate depends on the reaction of banks and financial markets to different 
shocks hitting the economy. For that purpose, a theoretical microeconomic model of the 
banking firm and the credit and deposits markets is used. We also present some evidence 
for the Colombian economy.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. A brief review of the literature is given in section 2. A 
discussion about the importance of the banking system and interest rate pass-through in 
Colombia is presented in section 3. A theoretical model of the banking firm and the 
financial markets equilibrium is developed in section 4. This model includes the effects of 
monetary policy and other macroeconomic conditions. The model is then used to interpret 
some episodes of interest rate transmission in Colombia. In section 5, some econometric 
evidence is shown. Finally, in section 6 we discuss the importance for the Central Bank to 
understand the role of banks’ and financial markets’ behavior in the interest rate pass-
through. We do so by means of numerical simulations of a small-open economy macro 
model which includes a simple version of our micro-banking model. 
 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
The literature has identified different transmission mechanisms of monetary policy such as 
the interest rate channel, the credit channel and the exchange rate channel among others
1. 
The importance of the banking sector in the transmission of interest rates has been recently 
recognized in the literature on the interest rate channel
2. At the same time, the credit 
channel has focused on the agency problems that arise between financial institutions, 
particularly banks, and the agents to which they lend (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995)
 3 . 
Therefore, the credit channel is now considered as a set of factors that amplify and 
propagate the effects of the interest rate channel through their impact on lending rates and 
other interest rate spreads.  
 
                                                 
1 See Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) for an overview about the transmission mechanisms.  
2 The importance of the banking sector in the interest rate pass-through is theoretically studied by Hannan and 
Berger (1991) and empirically assessed by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994). For an overview of the banking 
industry and monetary policy literature see Ahumada and Fuentes (2004). 
3 In contrast to the classical monetarist view that emphasizes the role of narrow and broad monetary 
aggregates in determining prices.    3
The banking sector has been incorporated in this literature, focusing mainly on the financial 
structure and information asymmetries
4. These two elements clearly influence the behavior 
of banks and help explain why lending and deposit rates may show a limited response to 
changes in the monetary policy rate.  
 
From Hannan and Berger (1991) and Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), the stickiness of bank 
lending interest rates after a change in the money market rates has been explained by 
different features of the financial structure. Empirical studies, like Berstein and Fuentes 
(2003) and Kot (2004) have found some degree of rigidity of interest rates in the short run 
and higher long-run interest rate pass-through coefficients. The degree of competition in the 
banking sector, the size of the bank, the types of customers and the loan risk level, among 




Furthermore, depending on the country and also on the maturity of the interest rates, they 
may respond less than one-for-one to policy rates, so that the pass-through is incomplete at 
least in the short run (e.g. De Bondt, 2005). The macroeconomic implications of an 
incomplete long-run pass-through from policy to bank interest rates are analyzed by Kwapil 
and Scharler (2005), who found that, under these conditions, the Taylor Principle can be 
insufficient for equilibrium determinacy
6. 
 
On a wider perspective, financial structure may influence interest rate pass-through by 
affecting the response of the financial markets to macroeconomic conditions. In particular, 
a macroeconomic shock may impact market interest rates directly and in addition to the 
response of the policy rate to the shock. In this sense, not only market rates may react with 
a delay to movements in policy rates, but also they may react more, less, or simply not react 
at all in the short run. As a result, the estimation of interest rate pass-through must control 
for the direct impact of other macro variables on market rates. This paper presents the latter 
ideas in some detail and explores the evidence of their relevance in the Colombian data.  
 
 
3. The Transmission of the Interest Rates in Colombia 
 
Studies for Colombia have found that, although there is a long-term relationship between 
policy and bank interest rates, interest rate pass-through is incomplete. Some of these 
studies have also documented the importance of the banking sector in Colombia and have 
suggested its significance in the transmission of interest rates. 
 
                                                 
4 Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) consider the financial structure as a term that broadly includes different 
features such as the degree of development of financial markets, the degree of competition within the banking 
system, the existence of constraints on capital movements and the ownership structure of the financial 
intermediaries.  
5 According to Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) interest rate stickiness means that in the presence of a change of 
money market rates, bank rates change by a smaller amount in the short run (short-run stickiness) and 
possibly also in the long run (long-run stickiness).  
6 This principle states that nominal interest rates have to respond at least one-for-one to changes in the 
expected inflation rate to guarantee a stable and unique equilibrium.   4
Julio (2001) found a stable long-term relationship between the interest rates in Colombia 
using cointegration for two periods, before and after the removal of the exchange rate band. 
Huertas et al. (2005) used descriptive statistics
7 to estimate that a 1% change in the 
monetary policy rate implies a change of 0.26% in the 90-day CDs rate in the short-run and 
a change of 0.6% in the long run
8. In addition, using VAR models they found that 
commercial short term, lending rates react one-for-one to the deposit rate, while the short-
run pass-through is just 42% for the ‘preferential’ short term, lending rate.  
 
Huertas et al. (2005) show that bank credit was the most important source of funds for 
firms between 2000 and 2004
9. However they suggest that the rather low transmission of 
the monetary policy interest rate to market interest rates can be explained by a loss in the 
effectiveness of the credit channel. They attributed this to the increase of banks’ holdings of 
Government bonds as an alternative to loans
10, and to the declining share of bank loans as a 
source of funds for firms during the period (2000-2004). This is in agreement with the 
results of Zamudio and Martinez (2006), who found that firms decreased their debt with the 
financial sector in 2005 and internal savings were their main source of funds (52% in 
contrast to 48% of external resources)
11.  
 
These results show that the importance of substitutes for loans in banks’ and firms’ balance 
sheets has increased. However, this change may reflect the adjustment made by agents after 
the financial crisis and the recession of 1998-1999, and not necessarily a structural change. 
A reduction of the loan supply might have been due to the higher risk perception of the 
economy by the financial system after the crisis, and a decrease in loan demand could have 
occurred because of an explicit policy of leverage reduction by firms and households. 
 
Bank loans and deposits remain an important component of private sector liabilities and 
assets, according to the flow of funds accounts. Financial debt funded on average 42% of 
the households’ and small firms’ total assets during the period 1996-2004. This figure is 
18% for financial-statement-reporting firms in the same period. This proportion fell after 
the recession, but has recovered in recent years (Graph 1). Further, the proportion of small 
firms’ and households’ assets held as deposits in the financial system was on average 42% 
of their total assets for the same period
12. 
 
This evidence suggests that the banking sector plays a relevant role as a provider of funds 
and as a deposit system for the private sector in the Colombian economy
13. Hence, a 
                                                 
7 The authors also use VAR models in differences in order to see the impact of the interbank interest rate on 
the 90-day CDs interest rate (DTF). 
8 The short run corresponds to one week and the long-run elasticity was calculated as an average of the 
change in the interest rates between movements in policy rates during the period from March 2001 to 
December 2004.  
9 The authors analyzed a sample of 3.585 financial-statement-reporting firms.  
10 According to the authors the proportion of the private credit on the banks’ total assets was 85% in 1994 and 
65% in 2004, while the banks’ public investments as a proportion of the total assets increased from 7% to 
27% during the same period.  
11 The sample analyzed includes 18.588 firms that reported their financial statements during 2005. 
12 This proportion is 50% if pensions are not taken into account.  
13 According to Villar, L. et al. (2005), in 2001 the domestic private credit/GDP ratio (a measure of financial 
deepening) was 25% for Colombia, similar to the ratios for Argentina, Perú and Ecuador. This indicator was 
65% for Chile, 97% for Thailand, 125% for China and 150% for Malaysia.   5
complete analysis of the monetary transmission channels and interest rate pass-through 










1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Private Sector Financial Debt/ Total Assets
Firms Households 





4. A Micro-Banking Model 
 
Recently, microeconomic models of banks’ behavior have been used to explain the role of 
financial structure in the transmission of interest rates. Berstein and Fuentes (2003) present 
a Monti-Klein model to explain the long run behavior of the banks under imperfect 
competition, taking into account the existence of credit risk. By using disaggregated data 
for different banks, they find that banks’ characteristics other than the industrial 
organization can influence the degree of delay in the market interest rate response to 
changes in the policy rate. Kot (2004) uses a similar microeconomic approach to assess the 
impact of the degree of competition in the credit market on the interest rates pass-through. 
Amaya (2005) found empirical evidence for Colombia of the importance of banks’ 
characteristics and inflation as long-run drivers of the market interest rates in a competitive 
setting.  
 
Following this strand of the literature, a partial equilibrium model is used in order to 
explain the transmission of interest rates under a perfectly competitive structure of the 
banking sector. From this model two main results are obtained. First, some macroeconomic 
variables apart from the policy rate are important determinants of equilibrium market 
interest rates. Second, the relationship between policy and market interest rates may not be 




   6
4.1. Assumptions 
 
Following Freixas and Rochet (1997) we consider a micro-banking model which allows for 
the existence of liquidity risk. This risk appears when there is an insufficient amount of 
reserves to serve the total amount of withdrawals made by the depositors.  
 
We assume that the level of reserves chosen by banks and the amount of withdrawals made 
by agents depend on the level of deposits, so  R = rD and  D x X ~ ~
=  where 0 ≤ r ≤1 and 
% [ ] 0,1 x∈ . This implies that the maximum amount of withdrawals is equal to the total 
amount of deposits
14 and that when % ( ] ,1 x r ∈ , banks have to borrow the shortfall from the 
Central Bank, incurring a cost  () % ( ) ,m a x 0 , p I Dr rD x r   =Ε −   , where rp is the policy 
interest rate. Further, we assume that the proportion of withdrawals follows a uniform 







Additionally, to understand how credit risk affects the competitive pricing of loans, we 
introduce a simple approach in which banks can recover only a fraction δ  of the loans 
granted ( L). The recovered proportion depends positively on the economic conditions of 
agents, measured by the income (Y )
15, and negatively on the loan interest rate (rL)
16. 
Therefore, only a proportion  () , Yr δ  of the loans are paid back and only on this portion 
agents pay interest. Thus, each bank has a net revenue given by 
() () () ,1 , LL L rY r L Y rL δδ −− . 
 
Since banking activity is modeled as the production of deposit and loan services, the 
technology is represented by a cost function  ( ) , CDL that can be interpreted as the cost of 
managing a volume  D of deposits and a volume  L of loans. The cost function is the same 
for all banks
17. Moreover, it can be assumed without loss of generality that costs are 
separable (cross-effects are zero), which means that we don’t take into account the 
existence of economies of scope in the joint production of loans and deposits.  
 
Finally, we incorporate banks’ holdings of government domestic bonds as an important 
decision variable, given that they have increased rapidly in Colombia since 2000. Thus, 
banks can invest in this riskless but illiquid asset (T ), with return rT .   
 
 
                                                 
14 In contrast to Freixas and Rochet (1997), there are no additional deposits. 
15 If firms and households have good economic conditions they can repay their loans with higher probability. 
16 This can be interpreted in two ways. First an increase in the loan interest rate implies a higher cost of 
resources for agents, causing a higher probability of default. The second interpretation follows Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) credit rationing argument, according to which an increase in the loan interest rate changes the 
risk of the population, either because agents take more risky projects or because less risky firms drop out of 
the market.  
17 This function is supposed to satisfy the usual conditions of convexity and regularity.    7
4.2. The Bank’s Problem 
 
Assuming a given banking technology, we examine the behavior of this sector under a 
perfectly competitive structure, where there are N  risk-neutral banks that are price takers
18. 
Each bank chooses the volumes of deposits ( D), loans ( L), reserves ( R) and government 
securities ( T ) that maximize profits subject to the balance sheet constraint: 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() ()
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This problem can be rewritten as follows: 
 
() ( ) () () () () () ()




















where bank’s profits are the revenues on assets (loans and government securities
19) minus 
the interest paid on the liabilities (deposits), the costs from credit and liquidity risks, and 
the operational costs.  
 
Profit maximizing behavior for each bank is characterized by the following first order 
conditions: 
() ( ) ( ) ()





rr r r C C δ

=− + − − −− − 

       (1) 
 
()( )
' .1 1 TL L rr C δ =+ − −         ( 2 )  
 
                                                 
18 They take as given the rate of loans, rL , the rate of deposits,rD , the return on government securities, rT , 
and the policy rate, p r .  
19 We assume that reserves do not have any return because we do not take into account the interbank market. 
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δ  +−−  =−        ( 4 )  
 
where    CL
'  and    CD
'  are the management marginal costs of loans and deposits, respectively. 
As in Freixas and Rochet (1997) and to simplify our analysis, these costs are assumed to be 
constant, so    CL
' = γ L  and    CD
' = γ D. 
 
Equation (1) implies that a competitive bank chooses the optimal amount of deposits in 
such a way that the marginal net revenue (taking into account the credit risk)
20, 
() ( ) ( ) 1. 1 1 LD rr r δ −+ − −   , must equal the marginal cost, which corresponds to the 








− −+ + 

.   
 
Equation (2) states that the marginal revenue on government bonds, rT , must equal their 
marginal opportunity cost (of not lending to private agents, taking into account the credit 
risk),  ()( ) .1 1 LL r δ γ +− − . Finally, from equation (3), the optimal level of reserves depends 
on their opportunity cost (of not lending these resources to private agents), relative to the 




δ γ +− −
.  
 
4.3. Equilibrium in the Deposit and Credit Markets 
 
In order to close the model and find the equilibrium market rates, we put together the 
balance sheets of the banks and the equilibrium conditions for the Deposit and Credit 













bD D T T T T rrrY − =−     (7) 
() 1 Dr L T −= +      (8) 
                                                 
20 This net income becomes from the possibility of lend a proportion ( ) 1 r −  of the deposits and pay interest on 
the total amount of deposits. It is necessary to take into account that there is a credit risk that not allows 
recovering all the loans granted and only a proportion of them pay interests. 






DDT DrrrY is the total supply of deposits by the non-financial agents, which depends 
positively on the domestic deposit interest rate and income, and negatively on the foreign 
deposit interest rate and the return on government securities. It is assumed that these two 





LL LrrY  is the loan demand by the agents in the economy, that depends negatively on 
the loan domestic interest rate and positively on the agents’ level of income. It also depends 
positively on foreign loans interest rates, which are assumed to be imperfect substitutes of 
domestic loans.  
 
 T
s  is the exogenous supply of securities by the government and  ()
* ,,,
d
bD D T T rrrY −  is the 
demand of these securities by other agents in the economy. It depends positively on the 
income and the own return, and negatively on the interest rate paid by domestic and foreign 
deposits, considered as imperfect substitutes of these securities.  
 
Hence, in equilibrium:  
 
() () ()( )
** * ,, 1 ,,, ,,,
ds S d
LL DDT b DDT LrrY r DrrrY T T rrrY − =− − +    (9) 
 
The equilibrium deposit and loan interest rates are derived from equations (1), (2), (3) and 
(9), as implicit functions of the exogenous variables  ( )
** ,,, ,,,
S




D Dp cD LD rr r r r T Y γ γ = . These functions are potentially non-linear because they 
depend on the functional forms of the deposit supply and loan demand
22.  
 
4.4. The Results 
 
The comparative statics analysis of equations (1)-(3) and (9) allows us to appreciate the 
effects of shocks to the exogenous variables on deposit and loan interest rates (see 
Appendix A for the details). 
 
Result 1:  The effect of a shift in the monetary policy interest rate, rp, on the equilibrium 
loan interest rate is positive. The effect of the same shift on the deposit interest rate is 
ambiguous.   
 
An increase in the policy interest rate makes the liquidity shortage more costly for banks. 
This has two implications. On the one hand, banks have more incentives to keep a higher 
level of reserves, implying a decrease in banks’ loan supply or an increase in deposit 
demand. Hence, there is an upward pressure on loan and deposit interest rates. On the other 
hand, since the cost of illiquidity depends on the amount of deposits, the rise in policy rates 
                                                 
22 Also, these functions can be non-linear if the withdrawals have a non-uniform probability distribution.    10
makes deposits more expensive and reduces banks’ demand for them. This pushes deposit 
rates down. 
 
Result 2:  A change in the foreign interest rates or the expectations of depreciation has a 
positive effect on equilibrium loan and deposit interest rates. 
  
If the foreign interest rates or the expectations of depreciation rise, agents in the domestic 
economy perceive a higher cost of borrowing abroad, increasing their demand for domestic 
loans. Thus, domestic loan interest rates increase. The higher demand for loans makes 
banks raise their deposit demand at the same time that agents reduce their supply of 
deposits because foreign deposits are more attractive. Hence, deposit interest rates also 
increase.  
 
Result 3:  The effect of a change in the income level on the equilibrium loan and deposit 
interest rates is ambiguous. 
 
An increase in income raises deposit supply and loan demand, implying a decline in the 
deposit rate and an increase in the loan rate. In order to satisfy the higher demand for loans, 
banks increase their demand for deposits, pushing deposit interest rates up. Additionally, 
given that credit risk is reduced by the agents’ better conditions (a higher proportion of 
loans will be recovered), banks have incentives to increase their loan supply inducing a 
downward pressure on loan rates. As a result, the effect of the shift in income on market 
rates is ambiguous.  
 
Result 4:  An increase in the government securities supply, T
s , implies a rise in the 
equilibrium level of loan and deposit interest rates. 
 
An additional supply of government securities competes with loans in banks’ portfolios and 
with deposits in the agents’ portfolios. This implies a reduction in the supply of deposits by 
firms and households, and a drop in the loan supply by commercial banks, increasing 
interest rates. This effect is reinforced if banks increase their demand for deposits to fund 
their purchases of government securities.   
 
Notice that, in general, the response of market interest rates to the exogenous shocks may 
not be linear and could depend on macro variables affecting the elasticities of the loan 
demand and the supply for deposits. In other words, that response is complex and may 
depend on the state of the economy. Furthermore, it is possible that a shock to an 
exogenous variable has an impact on others. For example, an increase in the foreign interest 
rate may cause movements in the policy rate, the expectations of depreciation and output. 
Hence, the observed response of market rates to “a” shock may involve a reaction to 
movements in several variables. 
 
As a corollary, we conclude that there is a possibly complex relationship between policy 
and market interest rates. We also conclude that interest rate pass-through depends on the 
state of the economy and that its estimation must control for the presence of other shocks 
hitting the financial markets.  
   11
4.5. Interpreting Some Episodes of Interest Rate Transmission in 
Colombia 
 
The foregoing model may be used to interpret some episodes of interest rate pass-through 
in Colombia. In particular, we will focus on two events in which the behavior of market 
rates markedly differed from the policy rate
23.  
 
Graph 2 shows that, although there is a long run relationship between the market and policy 
rates, there are differences in their short-run behavior. Two periods where these differences 
are easily observed are January 2000 - February 2001 and July 2002 - May 2003. In these 










                                                 
23 The policy rate corresponds to the interest rate at which the Central Bank gives liquidity to the market by 
means of an auction, which is called Subasta de Expansión. The market interest rates are the lending and 
deposit rates. The first one is the average interest rate for all types of loans weighted by their volume. The 
second one can be measured by the DTF, which corresponds to the weighted average of the interest rates for 
the 90-day CDs, and by the M3 interest rate, which corresponds to the weighted average of the interest rates 
for different types of deposits.   




































































































Source: Banco de la República 
Differential between market 










































































































































Loan minus policy rate DTF minus policy rate M3 minus policy rate
Source: Banco de la República  12
¾  January 2000-February 2001:  During this period the monetary policy interest rate 
was stable, while market interest rates were increasing
24. At the same time, the real 
quantities of loans and deposits in the financial system were going down. These 
facts suggest shifts of loan and deposit supplies larger than the shifts in their 
respective demands.  
 
This is the period immediately after a deep recession and a financial crisis 
characterized by a sharp deterioration of loan quality. At the same time, there was a 
large increase in the supply of Government domestic bonds.  As a consequence, the 
banks´ risk perceptions of the economy soared, their holdings of Government 
securities rose and loan supply dried. This implied a cut in the banks´ demand for 
deposits that, however, was more than compensated by the reduction in the supply 
that followed the increase in country risk, the rise in foreign interest rates, the 
presence of a high depreciation of the currency and the growing supply of 









                                                 
24 In the beginning of the period market interest rates continued their decreasing trend for one month and then 
changed their behavior. The lending interest rate was stable during four months and then increased by 280 
basis points. The deposit interest rates increased since February 2000. Specifically, the CD rates (DTF) went 




















































































































Source: Banco de la República




































































































Source: Banco de la República
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Source: Bloomberg and Banco de la República  13
¾  July 2002 - May 2003:  During this period, a sharp increase in country risk occurred 
that pushed up the depreciation of the currency. At the same time, growth recovered 
(Graph 4) and the quality of the loan portfolio continued to improve. Market rates 
slightly declined, while policy rates were kept constant until December 2002, and 
then were raised by 200 bps to curb inflationary pressures stemming from the 
depreciation of the currency. The real quantities of deposits and loans showed small 
increases. 
 
The increase in output growth and a better perception of the risk of the financial 
system pushed up the supply of deposits. This movement and the improvement in 
loan quality may have produced a positive shift in the loan supply. These factors 
would have implied a reduction in market interest rates, given a constant policy 
rate
25. However, the skyrocketing country risk and the ensuing depreciation exerted 
an upward pressure on interest rates that countered the previous effect. The jump in 
country risk also produced a loss of market value of Government securities that may 
have increased the supply of deposits, as agents rebalanced their portfolio away 
from Government debt and in favor of financial system liabilities. In the second part 
of the period, this shift was reinforced when country risk plummeted. Market 
interest rates must have declined, but then policy rates were raised, offsetting this 



























































































































                                                 
25  A higher economic growth may have also pushed loan demand. However, after the financial crisis there 
was a process of reduction in the leverage of the private sector.   14
5. Econometric Evidence 
 
The theoretical model developed in the previous section implies that market interest rates 
are affected by factors other than the policy rate. Therefore, the estimation of interest rate 
pass-through must control for movements in other macroeconomic variables, which may 
impact the loan and deposit markets equilibrium. To test this hypothesis, we follow two 
approaches. First, we assume the existence of a long run relationship between market and 
policy interest rates. Then we estimate uni-equational error correction models for the 
market rates, in which other macro variables suggested by the theoretical model are 
included as explanatory variables of the short run dynamics (See Appendix D for the 
description of the variables).  
 
In the second approach we acknowledge that some of the macro explanatory variables may 
be endogenous in a general equilibrium context. Hence, we estimate a VARX, perform 
Granger causality tests for the market interest rate equation to verify the significance of the 
macro variables in determining its dynamics, and examine the impulse response functions 
to check the direction of the market interest rate reaction to different shocks.  
 
5.1. Uni-equational Error Correction Models 
 
For both measures of the deposit interest rate, DTF and M3, we estimate uni-equational 
error correction models for the period June 1999-August 2006, with the policy interest rate, 
the industrial production index (as a measure of output), the EMBI, the foreign interest rate 
(LIBOR) and the nominal depreciation as explanatory variables. We also use a measure of 
the price change of Government securities as another exogenous variable. However, 
because this variable is only available from 2001 on, we decided to estimate another model 
with this shorter sample.  
 
Tables 1 and 2, show the estimations of different models for each measure of the deposit 
interest rate. The first model takes as explanatory variables the EMBI, the LIBOR and the 
Policy interest rate, which can be assumed to be exogenous in a more general model. The 
second model also includes the nominal depreciation and the industrial production index as 
exogenous variables, eventhough they can be endogenous in a more general setting. 
Finally, the third model was estimated for DTF introducing the price change of 
Government securities.  
 
In most cases, variables different from the policy interest rate and the residual of the long 
run equation
26 are significant in the error correction equations. Hence, the short run 
dynamics of deposit interest rates are influenced by other macro variables, as suggested by 
the theoretical model developed above. Also, in most cases the signs of the exogenous 
variables are those predicted by the theory, with the notable exception of the foreign 
interest rate.  
 
 
                                                 
26 This residual is obtained from the estimation of the long run relationship between the policy and the deposit 
interest rate.    15
Table 1. 
Dependent Variable: DM3




















Adjusted R-squared 0.654 0.722
S.E. of regression 0.257 0.230
Sum squared resid 5.042 3.945
Log likelihood -2013 8.049
Durbin-Watson stat 1.461 1.517
Akaike info criterion 0.195 -0.001203
Schwarz criterion 0.371 0.233599
F-statistic 31.676 31.099
Standard error in parenthesis
(1) This model does not consider variables which can be endogenous. 
     Sample  1999:11 2006:08. Included observations: 82 after adjustments
(2) This model includes other variables but they can be endogenous in a more general model. 
     Sample 1999:11 - 2006: 08. Included observations: 82 after adjustments
* This corresponds to  the difference of the logarithm
UNI-EQUATIONAL ERROR CORRECTION MODELS             
FOR  THE M3 INTEREST RATE
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Table 2. 
Dependent Variable: DDTF
Model 1  (1) Model 2  (2) Model 3  (3)
CONSTANT 0.009737 -0.001069 -0.035902
(0.031609) (0.035462) (0.018883)
































R-squared 0.829 0.749 0.757
Adjusted R-squared 0.801 0.726 0.725
S.E. of regression 0.232 0.287 0.113
Sum squared resid 3.681 6.132 0.582
Log likelihood 9.637 -10.035 43.013
Durbin-Watson stat 2.149 1.811 1.813
Akaike info criterion 0.059 0.439 -1.385
Schwarz criterion 0.416 0.674 -1.122
F-statistic 30.051 31.676 23.447
Standard error in parenthesis
(1) This model does not consider variables which can be endogenous. 
     Sample  2000:01 2006:08. Included observations: 80 after adjustments
(2) This model includes other variables but they can be endogenous in a more general model. 
     Sample 1999:11 - 2006: 08. Included observations: 82 after adjustments
(3) In addition to the variables considered in model 2 we also consider a measure of the return of government securities.
    Sample 2002:05 2006:08. Included observations: 52 after adjustments
* This corresponds to  the difference of the logarithm
UNI-EQUATIONAL ERROR CORRECTION MODELS                            
FOR THE 90-DAY DEPOSIT INTEREST RATE
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However, to assess the impact of exogenous shocks on market rates, one must take into 
account not only their direct effect on deposit rates, but also the indirect effects that occur 
through other macro variables that are endogenous in a general equilibrium context, such as 
the exchange rate, output and expectations. There may be also feed-back from market rates 
themselves to those macro endogenous variables. 
 
To capture the richer dynamics implied by the argument above, we estimate a VARX for a 
set of variables in first differences. We assume that the EMBI, the foreign interest rates and 
the policy rates are exogenous variables, while deposit rates, inflation, nominal depreciation 
and our measure of output are treated as endogenous (and the return on government 
securities when included). In order to verify our hypothesis, we check the significance of 
variables other than the policy rate in the deposit rate equation by means of Granger 
causality tests. Then, from the impulse-response functions we examine the impact of some 
shocks on deposit rates. In this context, the response to a shift in the policy rate may be 
regarded as an appropriate measure of interest rate pass-through, since most direct and 
indirect effects are taken into account. 
 
5.2. VARX models 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show the Granger Causality tests for two specifications of VARX that 
include DTF or the M3 interest rates, respectively. In each case a system was estimated 
with and without the price change of Government bonds.
27  
 
For the DTF equation, the policy rate, the nominal depreciation and the EMBI Granger 
cause this deposit rate when the larger sample is used
28. With the shorter sample, the policy 
rate, the nominal depreciation, the industrial production index, the EMBI, and the price 
change of Government securities Granger cause the DTF rate (Table 3). The equation for 
the M3 interest rate shows that the policy rate, inflation, nominal depreciation and the 
EMBI Granger-cause this deposit rate in the larger sample
29. For the shorter sample, the 
policy rate, the industrial production index, the EMBI, the price change of Government 
securities and the foreign interest rate Granger cause the M3 rate (Table 4).  
 
The impulse-response functions of the VARX for the DTF and M3 interest rates are 
presented in Appendix B and show a positive short-run reaction of market rates to policy 
rate shocks. For other shocks, the market interest rates short-run response is sometimes in 
agreement with the theoretical model. In particular, there is a positive response of the DTF 
rate to shocks to the EMBI.  
 
                                                 
27 There may exist a bias in the estimation because we are not taking into account the long run relationship 
between market and policy interest rates and other long run relations between the variables included in the 
VARX. A method that allows to estimate the correct long and short run relationships is a VEC, but the sample 
is too short to use this technique. 
28 At 10% of significance inflation also Granger causes the DTF. 
29 At 10% of significance the foreign interest rate (Libor) also Granger causes the M3 interest rate.   18
Table 3. 
Null Hypothesis Test-value Probability 
DDEPRECIATION  not Granger cause DDTF 26.56 0.0002
DIPI not Granger cause DDTF 3.62 0.7284
DINFLATION not Granger cause DDTF 11.02 0.0878
DEMBI not Granger cause DDTF 13.58 0.0592
DPOLICY not Granger cause DDTF 88.14 0.0001
DLIBOR not Granger cause DDTF 3.70 0.8136
* VARX(6,6)  6 lags for endogenous and exogenous variables
Null Hypothesis Test-value Probability 
DDEPRECIATION  not Granger cause DDTF 9.93 0.0191
DIPI not Granger cause DDTF 7.87 0.0489
DINFLATION not Granger cause DDTF 5.67 0.1288
DITES not Granger cause DDTFN 22.19 0.0001
DEMBI not Granger cause DDTF 14.48 0.0059
DPOLICY not Granger cause DDTF 12.28 0.0154
DLIBOR not Granger cause DDTF 7.38 0.1171
* VARX(3,3) 3 lags for endogenous and exogenous variables
Model 2
Granger Causality Tests on DTF               






Null Hypothesis Test-value Probability 
DDEPRECIATION not Granger cause DM3 25.78 0.0002
DIPI not Granger cause DM3 10.43 0.1077
DINFLATION not Granger cause DM3 27.80 0.0001
DEMBI not Granger cause DM3 18.80 0.0088
DPOLICY not Granger cause DM3 87.14 0.0001
DLIBOR not Granger cause DM3 12.78 0.0778
* VARX(6,6)  6 lags for endogenous and exogenous variables
Null Hypothesis Test-value Probability 
DDEPRECIATION not Granger cause DM3 1.84 0.7656
DIPI not Granger cause DM3 10.88 0.0279
DINFLATION not Granger cause DM3 5.84 0.2113
DITES not Granger cause DDTFN 15.66 0.0035
DEMBI not Granger cause DM3 23.86 0.0001
DPOLICY not Granger cause DM3 52.19 0.0001
DLIBOR not Granger cause DM3 12.62 0.0133
* VARX(4,3) 4 lags for endogenous and  3 lags for exogenous variables
Model 1
Model 2
Granger Causality Tests on M3
Granger Causality Tests on M3
   19
6. A Small-Open Economy Macro Model 
 
In section 4 we showed that the equilibrium market interest rates depend not only on policy 
rates, but also on other macro variables affecting credit demand and deposit supply, such as 
income, external interest rates, risk premia and the expectations of inflation and real 
depreciation among others. These are exogenous variables in a partial equilibrium setting, 
but some become endogenous once one considers the functioning of the economy as a 
whole. Hence, interest rate pass-through may be a complex process, with changes in policy 
having both direct and indirect effects on market rates, the latter taking place through shifts 
in income, depreciation, inflation and expectations. By the same token, shocks hitting the 
economy may have direct effects on market interest rates, given a constant policy rate.  
 
For example, an increase in external interest rates or the country risk premium will affect 
not only the exchange rate, as expected, but also market interest rates, since deposits and 
central bank credit are imperfect substitutes for banks due to the liquidity risk. Were they 
perfect or very close substitutes, the domestic interest rates would be set by the Central 
Bank and all the adjustment will be born by the exchange rate. 
 
In addition, the model developed in section 4 suggested that the relationship between policy 
and market interest rates might not be “one for one”, or even linear. That relationship 
depends on the functional forms of the demand for credit, the supply of deposits and the 
probability distributions involved in the various risks facing the banking firm. This further 
complicates the interest rate pass-through. 
 
A policy implication follows immediately from the previous arguments: The Central 
Bank´s policy rule should take into account the direct effects of other (exogenous and 
endogenous) macro variables on market rates. It should also consider the possibly complex 
relationship between policy and market rates. If these factors are empirically relevant, a 
failure by the Central Bank to include them in its reaction function may increase the risk of 
missing its targets and/or may introduce excessive volatility to interest rates and output. 
 
These ideas can be illustrated with a simpler version of the model presented above. In 
particular, assume that there is neither credit risk nor public debt. There is only a liquidity 
risk for banks. Deposit interest rates are determined by the equilibrium conditions in the 




* * ( , ,)1 ( , ) ( , ,)
ee e e e e e e
DD p D D ii e Y r ii C i m i e Y ππ π π π π −+ − − −−= − + + −   (10) 
 
Where D(.) and C(.) are the deposit supply and credit demand functions, respectively. r(.) is 
the fraction of deposits that banks optimally choose to hold as reserves. Y is the level of 
output. iD and  ip are the nominal deposit and policy rate, respectively. m is a constant 
intermediation spread that accounts for operational costs. i* is the external nominal interest 
rate and 
^
e e and π
e are the expectations of depreciation and inflation, respectively. As in 
section 4, the following assumptions are made about the functional forms: 















And the following features of the function r(.) are obtained:  0, 0
Dp ii rr < >  
 
Starting from a long run equilibrium situation in which  π = π
e = π
TARGET, suppose that there 
is a transitory shock to the external interest rate, i
*, and that the Central Bank is a “strict 
inflation targeter” that will move its policy rate, ip, so that the inflation target is met at 
every period. Furthermore, assume that the public fully trust the inflation target. In these 
circumstances,  0






. Assuming that the Central Bank knows all the parameters 
and the structure of the economy, from equation (10) the required adjustment of the policy 
rate is given by: 
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diD  is the adjustment in the deposit rate that is required to keep inflation on target. 
* di
dY
 is the change in output that results from the shock to the foreign interest rate, i
*, the 





 is the 
movement of the expectations of depreciation that follows the shock to i
*, the responses of 
iD and ip and all the ensuing macroeconomic effects. 
 
Three results are obtained from equation (11): 
 
(i)  The “direct” response of the policy rate to the required adjustment in the market 
rate is not necessarily equal to one. The expression 
() ( ) (1 )
DD D p ii i i Dr D r CD r −− −  is generally positive, but may not even be 
constant. It may change with the levels of Y, iD, i
* and other variables that might 
affect the elasticities or “slopes” of credit demand, deposit supply and reserves 
demand.  
 
(ii)  Beyond the “direct” response to the required adjustment in the market rates, 
policy rates may have to respond independently to the shock itself.  The term 
() () ** (1 )
p i ii Dr CD r −−  is generally negative, suggesting a negative reaction of 
policy rates to the shift in external interest rates.  Intuitively, if market rates 
react directly to the shock in foreign interest rates, Central Bank rates do not   21
change in the expectations of depreciation that results from the shock and the 
ensuing adjustment. 
 
(iii)  Also, policy interest rates may respond to the change in output that follows the 
shock. In this case, however, the effect on policy rates is ambiguous since, as 
shown in section 4, changes in output hit both loan demand and deposit supply, 
inducing movements of market rates in opposite directions. 
 
As an example of these results, Graph 5 show the simulated responses of several macro 
variables to a transitory shock in the foreign interest rate, based on a small, open economy 
model with backward-looking expectations, imperfect capital mobility and a banking sector 
facing a liquidity risk. The model is presented in Appendix C and the simulations assume 
that the Central Bank sets the policy rate so that π = π
TARGET = 0. 
 
Starting from a steady state situation, a one-period increase in the foreign interest rate 
induces capital outflows and a nominal and real depreciation of the currency. The ensuing 
inflationary pressures force the Central Bank to raise domestic interest rates, producing a 
negative output gap. As expected, the trade balance becomes positive on impact. The 
subsequent dynamics involve a downward correction in domestic interest rates to eliminate 
the output gap and counter the currency appreciation that follows the return of the foreign 
interest rate to its long run value and the interest income received from the previous capital 
outflows. 
 
The aspect we want to highlight in the simulations is the behavior of policy and market 
interest rates. In Graph 5 they share the same dynamics, with the levels of the policy rate 
being higher, as explained in the Appendix C. However, the ratio of the two rates shows 
that the reaction of policy interest rates to the external shock is proportionally lower than 
the response of market rates
30. This occurs because the shock to the foreign interest rate has 
an independent impact on market rates, so the response of policy rates that is required to 
keep inflation on target needs not be as large as the required reaction in deposit rates.   
                                                 
30 Since the policy rate is roughly a multiple of the market rate (see equation A14 in Appendix C), by 
construction the difference between them closely resembles the evolution of the policy rate. This is why the 
ratio of the rates is a more appropriate measure of their distance in this model.   22
Graph 5. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
In contrast to the standard approach to monetary policy, which considers the banking sector 
as a passive aggregate, this paper focused on the implications of modeling commercial 
banks as independent entities that optimally react to their environment. 
 
Based on a theoretical microeconomic model of the banking firm and the credit and 
deposits markets, we illustrated the idea that the response of market interest rates to 
changes in the policy interest rate may be a complex process that depends on the state of 
the economy. We argued that the estimation of interest rate pass-through must control for 
other shocks hitting the financial system. The model is used to interpret some episodes of 
interest rate pass-through in Colombia and the results from uni-equational error correction 
and VARX models seem to support our hypotheses. 
 
Finally, a small macro model illustrated the importance for the Central Bank to understand 
the role of bank behavior in the interest rate pass-through. In particular, consideration of the 
direct impact of exogenous shocks on the financial system may affect the appropriate 
policy response. Depending on its empirical relevance, this hypothesis implies that the 
Central Bank may miss its targets or introduce excessive volatility to interest rates and 
output, if financial market behavior is ignored. 
   24
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Appendix A 
 
The Micro-Banking Model 
 
A.1. Effect of a marginal shift in the monetary policy interest rate: 
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δγ +− −  ∂  =− <
∂
 is the direct impact of the policy rate on the 
deposit rate. This effect is negative because a higher policy rate implies a higher 
illiquidity cost and, as the withdrawals depend on the amount of deposits, banks will 
demand deposits only at lower deposit rates.  
 












 is the impact of the loan interest rate on the government 
securities return, which is ambiguous because a positive shift in loan interest rates 
implies an increase in the credit risk, 
∂δ
∂rL
< 0. However, if the economic conditions 
are good, the proportion of recovered loans  ( ) . δ  can be sufficiently high to 
compensate the increasing credit risk, so that, 
∂rT
∂rL
 will be positive. Intuitively, 









 is the bank’s marginal revenue derived from an increase in rL . If 
it is positive, banks will increase loans, demand less government bonds and the 
price of the latter will fall (r T will go up). 
 
(iii) 
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∂
 is the impact of the loan interest rate on the banks’ 
fraction of reserves It is also ambiguous and depends on credit risk. As before, if the 
increase in credit risk is smaller than the recovered proportion of loans, this effect is   27
negative. Intuitively, if the bank’s revenues increase with the rise in rL , banks will 
lend more and reduce reserves. 
  
(iv)  
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 is the impact of loan interest rate 
on deposit rates. From equation (2), we know that  ( )( ) ( ) .1 1 LL r δγ + −−  is positive 
if there are positive returns on government securities. Additionally, as before, if 











> 0. Intuitively, if the bank’s revenues increase 
with the rise in rL , they will demand more deposits inducing an upward pressure on 
rD . 
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 is the direct impact of the policy rate on the proportion 
of reserves,  which is positive if  rT > 0. If the policy rate increases, the illiquidity cost 
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>0 and the own elasticity on the demand 
for deposits (demand for government securities) is greater than the cross-elasticity with 


















. Thus we suppose that agents react more to the own 
returns of each asset than to the return of alternative assets.  
 
The impact of a change in the policy rate on the deposit interest rate depends on the 
direct effect, which is negative, and the effect through the loan rate, which is positive. 




A.2. Effect of a marginal change in the foreign interest rates  
 
Differentiating equation (8) with respect to rL
* and rD
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 were explained and signed above. The signs of these two 
expressions depend again on the assumptions about the elasticities. If we assume that 
the direct elasticities are higher than the cross-elasticities, then the impact of a change 
in the foreign interest rates is positive on the loan and deposit interest rates.  
 
A.3. Effect of a marginal shift in the level of income: 
 
Differentiating equation (8) with respect to Y  yields the following result: 
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 is positive, because an increase in the level 
of income improves the credit risk perception of banks and induce them to demand 
more deposits. 
 









  is positive because 
∂δ
∂Y
> 0. An increase in the level of income 
improves the credit risk perception of banks, induce them to grant more loans and to 
reduce their demand for government securities. Thus, the return of these bonds must 
increase (their prices must fall). 
 







 is negative. If the output increases, credit risk is lower and 
banks prefer to grant more loans and keep less reserves.  
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 is ambiguous, 




> 0, at the same time that banks 
grant more loans. The final impact on the deposit rate is also ambiguous, because agents 




> 0, while banks increase their demand 
for deposits.   
 
A.4. Effect of a marginal shift in the government securities supply 
 
Differentiating equation (8) with respect to T
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 were explained and signed above. The same assumptions 
about elasticities imply that 
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In this appendix we show some econometric results. First we show the results of unit 
root tests for the interest rates. Then the estimated long-run relationship between policy 
and market interest rates is shown. For the VARX, we present the impulse responses for 
the equations of the two deposit interest rates (DTF and M3).  
 
B.1. Unit Root Tests 
 
We carried out two unit root tests, the Augmented Dickey.Fuller and the KPSS, in order 
to check the non-stationarity of the interest rates (Table 5). The Augmented 
Dickey.Fuller test does not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for the DTF at all 
significance levels. For the M3 this hypothesis is not rejected at 1% of significance. The 
test for the policy rate shows that the unit root hypothesis is not rejected at 1% and 
5%
31. For the three interest rates, the KPSS test rejects the null hypothesis that each 
variable is stationary at all levels of significance. We can conclude from these results 
that the analyzed interest rates are I(1).     
 
Table 5. 
Test statistic Test statistic
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10%
DTF  (1) -1.047 -3.517 -2.899 -2.587 1.050 0.739 0.463 0.347
M3 interest rate -3.407 -3.510 -2.896 -2.585 1.096 0.739 0.463 0.347
Policy interest rate (3) -2.774 -3.511 -2.896 -2.586 0.928 0.739 0.463 0.347
(1) 9 Lags used to get white noise residuals. 
(2) 2 Lags used to get white noise residuals. 
(3) 3 Lags used to get white noise residuals. 
Critical Values  Critical Values 
Unit Root Tests
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test KPSS Test




B.2. Long Run Relationship 
 
The estimated long-run relationship between the policy rate and the deposit interest 
rates is shown in Table 6. The unit root tests show that the residual of the equation for 
the DTF is stationary at 5% and 10%, with the Engle-Yoo critical values. The residuals 
of the equation for the M3 interest rate do not present a unit root according to the 
Engle-Yoo critical values at all significance levels. These results imply that there is a 
cointegration between the deposit interest rates and the policy rate because these 
variables are I(1) and the residuals are I(0). 
                                                 
31 For this test we take the minimum number of lags to get white-noise in the residuals. If the information 
criterion is used we do not get white-noise.    31
Table 6. 
DTF  (1) M3 (2)
Constant 1.132 -0.777980
(0.345) (0.271)
Policy Rate 1.003 0.822
(0.037) (0.029)
Test Statistic* -2.575 -3.075
1% 5% 10%
2.60 1.95 1.61
* Ho: existence of a unit root
** Critical values for a sample of 100 observations and non-constant
(1) 3 Lags used in the residual test to get white noise
(2) Lags=3 used in the residual test to get white noise
Long Run Equations






B.3. Impulse-Response Functions  
 
The impulse-response functions for the DTF equation in the VARX are shown in Graph 
6, including and not the price change of the Government securities. Graph 7 shows the 
impulse-response functions for the M3 interest rate equation with and without the price 
change of the public bonds.  
 
   32
Graph 6. 
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Graph 7. 
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Appendix C 
 
A Small Macroeconomic Model with a Banking Sector 
 
To perform the simulations presented in section 6, the following model of a small, open 
economy was used. It assumes imperfect capital mobility, backward-looking 
expectations of inflation and depreciation, and includes a simple version of the banking 
sector model developed in section 4. The basic setting is an ad-hoc system of an open-
economy Phillips Curve, an open-economy IS equation and a balance of payments 
equation. In the long run the PPP and UIP conditions are met, but in the short run there 
may movements in the real exchange rate explained by the short-run price stickiness, 
and there may be deviations from the UIP condition because of the assumption of 
imperfect capital mobility. The latter is compatible with the existence of a demand for 
bank loans and a supply of bank deposits, which are imperfect substitutes of foreign 
bank loans and deposits, respectively.  
 
Phillips Curve: 
t t t o
e
t t q q y ε α α π π + − + + = ) (
_
1  (A6) 
 
Inflation depends on inflation expectations, the output gap and the deviations of the real 
exchange rate (RER) from its PPP long run level. If the currency is undervalued, the 
RER is above its long run level and inflation goes up as part of the adjustment of the 
RER toward its long run equilibrium. Inflation expectations are formed in the beginning 











1 1  (A7) 
D
t i is the nominal domestic market (deposit) interest rate.
32 It is assumed that banks´ 
interest rates are the relevant prices in the transmission mechanism.
33 δo and δ2 > 0. δ1 < 
0. µt is an aggregate demand shock.  
 
Balance of Payments: 






























t t t t o e i i f e i i f i y nx q q nx ζ  (A8)   
 
The deviation of the trade balance from its long run equilibrium depends positively on 
the RER deviation (nxo > 0) and negatively on the output gap (nx1 < 0). One period 
capital inflows f[.] are assumed. They depend positively on the domestic-external 
                                                 
32 The lending rate could be included. However, since constant operational marginal costs are assumed for 
banks, the inclusion of deposit rates is equivalent. The distinction would be important if the credit channel 
were relevant feature of the model economy as in Bernanke and Blinder (1992).  
33 To be consistent with the assumption of imperfect substitution between foreign and domestic loans and 
deposits, the foreign interest rate gap should also be included in the equation. We do not do so for simplicity.    35
interest rate differential. i




t e are the 
expectations of depreciation formed in the beginning of each period. ζt is a balance of 
payments shock. In the long run equilibrium, 
_




t e i i + = , so that both the 
current and the capital accounts are zero in steady state. For the simulations we use a 



















− −    (A9) 
 
where g is a positive constant. Also, for the simulations we use the following definition 
of the RER: 
*
^
1 t t t t t e q q π π + − + = −    (A10) 
 
A floating exchange rate regime is assumed, so the nominal depreciation adjusts every 



















   (A11) 
 
Expectations are backward-looking and are formed in the beginning of each period.  
 








t t i i
π
ψ
  (A12) 
 
The foreign interest rate may be hit by transitory shocks. Foreign inflation is always 




The Financial System: 
 
We use a simpler version of the banking firm model presented in section 4. There is 
only liquidity risk and there are no government bonds. The competitive, risk-neutral 
bank lends, takes deposits and holds liquid assets (“reserves”) to be able to pay-back 
random withdrawals by depositors. So, the balance sheet identity of the bank is:  
L + R = D.  
                                                 
34 Deposit-lending interest rate spreads are supposed constant and equal in the domestic economy and abroad. 
That is why only deposit rates are included in the capital flows function.     36
 
Let  x ~be the fraction of total deposits, D, that is withdrawn. x ~ is a random variable 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Let ρ  the fraction of total deposits that the bank 
chooses to hold as reserves. If total withdrawals exceed reserves, the bank must borrow 
the shortfall from the Central Bank at (real) interest rate rp, which is the policy rate. 
Hence, the expected cost of the funds borrowed from the central bank is: 
1 2 (1 )
[( 0 , ( ) ] ( )
2






 ∫ %% %  and the optimization problem 
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where rL and  rD are real interest rates on loans and deposits, respectively, and m is a 
constant marginal operational cost incurred on loans.  
 




















From these two equations we obtain the optimal fraction of reserves as a function of the 








ρ =−    (A13) 
 
which indicates that the optimal reserve fraction increases with the cost of  Central 
Bank liquidity (the cost of not having reserves) and decreases with the market interest 
rates (opportunity cost of holding reserves). An interesting implication of equation 









=    (A14) 
 
Actually, in the absence of other risks and costs, in this model deposit interest rates are 
below policy rates. Also, as it is apparent from equation (A14), if the reserve fraction 
does not vary too much, the difference between the market and policy rates will move 
with the level of the policy rate. This is an example of the rather complex relationship 
that may exist between policy and market rates.  
   37
To introduce the equilibrium in the deposit and loan markets in the macroeconomic 
model, we express the balance-sheet constraint in terms of deviations from the steady 
state: 
__ _ _




() ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) tt t t DD LLD ρ ρρ −− = − + −    (A15) 
 
Let the following functions represent the deviations of the demand for loans and the 



















) ( λ λ + − − = −    (A17) 
 
In the latter equation, lending-deposit interest rate spreads are assumed to be equal in 
the economy and abroad.  
 












t i r π − = , equations (A13) and (A15)-(A.17) define the equilibrium deposit rates in 
terms of the policy rate and macro variables like the output gap, the expectations of 
depreciation and inflation, and foreign interest rates.   
 
Monetary Policy Rule: 
 
It is assumed that the Central Bank knows the structure and parameters of the economy, 
including the behavior of banks and the features of the financial markets. With that 
knowledge, the Central Bank sets the policy rates, so that the π
TARGET = 0  is met every 





The deposit rate that results from the equilibrium in the loans and deposit markets, and 
the monetary policy rule are then included in the macro model (A6)-(A12), to yield the 
equilibrium inflation, nominal depreciation and output gap in terms of the exogenous 
variables. The order of events in the model economy is as follows: (i) Agents form 
expectations. (ii) Shocks occur. (iii) The Central Bank reacts to the shocks. (iv) 
Endogenous variables (market interest rates, the output gap, nominal depreciation and 
inflation) are determined. 
 
In steady state, inflation is on target, and nominal depreciation and inflation 
expectations equal inflation. The output gap, the trade balance and capital flows are 
zero. The RER is at its long-run PPP level and domestic loan and deposit interest rates 
fulfill the UIP condition. The reserves ratio, ρ, is at its long run level which, given UIP,   38
is determined by the external interest rates (see the first order conditions of the bank´s 
problem above). The steady state policy rate is obtained from equation (A14), given the 
steady state values of  ρ  and rD. 
 
Parameters used in the Simulation: 
 
Long run levels of interest and real exchange rates: 
_




r r = = 0.025 
 
Parameters of the macroeconomic equations: 
αo = 0.2 
α1 = 0.04  
δo = 0.7 
δ1 = -0.1 
δ2 = 0.02 
nxo = 0.1 
nx1 = 0.2 
g = 1 
 
Parameters of the Financial System: 
ω0 = 1 
ω1 = 1 
λo = 1 
λ1 = 1 
_
D = 1 
_
ρ  = 0.025   39
Appendix D 
 
The description of the variables used in the econometric exercise is given in the 




Variable Definition  Sample  Frequency  Source 
DDTF  Difference of the nominal 90-day 
deposit interest rate 
June 1999 
August 2006 
Monthly  Banco de la 
República 
DM3 (1)  Difference of the nominal average 
deposit interest rate  
June 1999 
August 2006 
Monthly  Banco de la 
República 
DPOLICY  Difference of the nominal policy 
interest rate “Subasta de Expansión” 
June 1999 
August 2006 
Monthly  Banco de la 
República 




Monthly  Banco de la 
República 





DIPI  Logarithmic difference of the 





DITES  Logarithmic difference of the I-TES 
(Price Index of a representative bundle 



















(1) The M3 interest rate corresponds to the average of the interest rates for different types of deposits (saving accounts, 90-day CDs 
and 360-day CDs) weighted by their volume. 
 
(2) LIBOR (London Interbank Offer Rate) is the interest rate for 3-month deposits in dollars.  